Security of the TCG Privacy-CA Solution
Security of the TCG Privacy-CA Solution
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DOI：
10.1109/euc.2010.98
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发表时间：
2010-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Liqun Chen;B. Warinschi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Liqun Chen;B. Warinschi
隐私CA解决方案（PCAS）是由可信计算组（TCG）设计的协议，作为用于可信协议的匿名认证的直接匿名证明方案的替代方案。该协议已在TPM规范版本1.2中指定。在本文中，我们提供了一个严格的安全性分析的协议。我们首先设计了一个适当的安全模型，捕获PCAS提供的安全级别。该模型是合理的，通过预期使用的协议在真实的应用。然后，我们证明，假设标准的基本原语的安全概念，该协议确实符合我们设计的安全概念。我们的分析揭示了一些光的协议的设计。最后，我们提出了一个加强的协议，满足更强的安全概念，对手被允许自适应腐败TPM。
The privacy-CA solution (PCAS) is a protocol designed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) as an alternative to the Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme for anonymous authentication of Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The protocol has been specified in TPM Specification Version 1.2. In this paper we offer a rigorous security analysis of the protocol. We first design an appropriate security model that captures the level of security offered by PCAS. The model is justified via the expected uses of the protocol in real applications. We then prove, assuming standard security notions for the underlying primitives that the protocol indeed meets the security notion we design. Our analysis sheds some light on the design of the protocol. Finally, we propose a strengthened protocol that meets a stronger notion of security where the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt TPMs.