Control Premium in Legally-Constrained Markets for Corporate Control: The Italian Case (1993-2003)
Control Premium in Legally-Constrained Markets for Corporate Control: The Italian Case (1993-2003)
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公司控制权受法律约束的市场中的控制溢价：意大利案例（1993-2003）
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.962353
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Laura Zanetti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Massari;Vittorio Monge;Laura Zanetti
我们讨论由Barclay和Holderness （1989, Journal of Financial Economics, 25: 371-395）率先提出的简单模型，以及最近由Dyck和Zingales （2004a, Journal of Finance, 2,537 - 600; 2004b Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 16,51 - 72）重新提出的模型，以衡量控制权转移受法律监管的国家（如意大利）的控制权价值。我们证明了将B&H方法的应用范围扩大到大宗交易之后的强制性投标报价是可能的，并且我们展示了在考虑自愿投标报价时，我们可能获得重大私人利益的条件。为了检验我们的理论预测，我们分析了1993年至2003年间涉及意大利上市公司普通股的27笔控制权交易的定价。我们发现，在纯大宗交易的情况下，大宗交易（投标）溢价平均相当于公司股权价值的8%，在大宗交易之后进行强制性要约收购的情况下，溢价为9%，而在自愿要约收购的情况下，溢价增加到18%。结果表明，在大宗交易之后的强制性收购要约的情况下，收购方不会转移其盈余的更大一部分。这种情况不会发生在自愿出价的情况下，在这种情况下，掠夺者的议价能力会崩溃。我们对控制权溢价的估计明显低于先前基于类似方法的研究，为控制权估值目的提供了最新证据，并与旨在评估致力于保护小股东的规则质量的跨国研究进行了比较。我们还对私人控制收益进行了横断面回归分析，并证实了之前文献中提出的一些发现：特别是，我们发现私人控制收益的大小与目标公司股票金字塔化程度之间存在正相关的证据。我们还发现，外国收购者和金融投资者在获取控制权的私人利益方面似乎可能面临更大的困难。施普林格2006版权所有
We discuss the simple model pioneered by Barclay and Holderness (1989, Journal of Financial Economics 25: 371–395) and recently reproposed by Dyck and Zingales (2004a, Journal of Finance 2, 537–600; 2004b Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 16, 51–72) in order to measure the value of control in countries, like Italy, where transfer of control is regulated by law. We demonstrate that it is possible to broaden the application of B&H approach to block trades followed by mandatory tender offers and we show the conditions under which we may obtain significant measures of private benefits also when voluntary tender offers are considered. In order to test for our theoretical predictions, we analyse the pricing of 27 control transactions involving the common stock of Italian listed corporations between 1993 and 2003. We find that block-transaction (tender) premium equals on average 8% of the firm’s equity value in the case of pure block-trades, 9% in the case of block trades followed by a mandatory tender offer, while it increases to 18% in the case of voluntary tender offers. The results suggest that, in the case of block trades followed by a mandatory tender offer, the acquirer does not transfer a larger portion of its surplus. This doesn’t take place in the case of voluntary tender offers, in which the raider’s bargaining power collapses. Our estimate of the control premium is sensibly lower than that presented in previous studies based on similar methodologies, providing up-to-date evidence for control stake valuation purposes and for comparison with cross country studies aiming at assessing the quality of rules devoted to minority shareholders’ protection. We also perform a cross-sectional regression analysis of private benefits of control and confirm some of the findings presented in the previous literature: particularly, we find evidence of a positive relation between the magnitude of private benefits of control and the target’s degree of stock-pyramiding. We also find that foreign acquirers and financial investors seem likely to face greater difficulties in extracting private benefits of control. Copyright Springer 2006