Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: A Graph Theoretic Approach
Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: A Graph Theoretic Approach
复制标题
Bimatrix 游戏中得到良好支持的近似均衡:图论方法
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-540-74456-6_53
复制
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
P. Spirakis
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Kontogiannis;P. Spirakis
We study the existence and tractability of a notion of approximate equilibria in bimatrix games, called well supported approximate Nash Equilibria (SuppNE in short).We prove existence of e-SuppNE for any constant e ? (0, 1), with only logarithmic support sizes for both players. Also we propose a polynomial-time construction of SuppNE, both for win lose and for arbitrary (normalized) bimatrix games. The quality of these SuppNE depends on the girth of the Nash Dynamics graph in the win lose game, or a (rounded-off) win lose image of the original normalized game. Our constructions are very successful in sparse win lose games (ie, having a constant number of (0, 1)-elements in the bimatrix) with large girth in the Nash Dynamics graph. The same holds also for normalized games whose win lose image is sparse with large girth.
Finally we prove the simplicity of constructing SuppNE both in random normalized games and in random win lose games. In the former case we prove that the uniform full mix is an o(1)-SuppNE, while in the case of win lose games, we show that (with high probability) there is either a PNE or a 0.5-SuppNE with support sizes only 2.