RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd
RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd
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RUSI 154_3 文本 2009 年 6 月.indd
DOI:
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发表时间:
2009
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
V. Bhargava
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
M. Gupta;S. Garg;V. Bhargava
There is a growing consensus that the Bri sh are no longer any good at counter-insurgency (COIN). The irony is that just a few years ago, senior Bri sh officers felt able to lecture the Americans (much to their annoyance), o en contras ng US problems in Iraq with Britain’s record of successful COIN campaigns from the end of empire.1Now the roles appear reversed. The US Army and Marine Corps produced a new COIN manual (FM 3-24) in December 2006 that is now in use by militaries the world over.2 Informing this manual are new COIN tac cs and capabili es that were developed and road-tested by US ba alions in Iraq in 2005–06. Around this me, the Bri sh were beginning to lose their hold over Basra. Bri sh failure in Iraq was complete when it was le to the Iraqi Army, supported by the US military, to wrestle back control of Basra city from Shia mili a in March 2008.3 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that The Economist should note ‘a new mood of self-doubt’ in the Bri sh military, ci ng one Bri sh general as declaring that ‘we have lost our way’ when it comes to small wars.4 The failure of Iraq casts a long shadow over the Bri sh campaign in Afghanistan.5 Cri cs rou nely pair the two campaigns, concluding that both demonstrate that ‘we lack the troops, wealth and stomach for anything more than the briefest conflict’.6 Just as the lack of will, resources and strategy undercut military opera ons in Iraq, so COIN MACHINE