Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: theory and evidence
Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: theory and evidence
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DOI：
10.1016/s0167-2681(02)00139-7
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发表时间：
2003-05-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Seki, E
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gaspart, F;Seki, E
我们研究线性收入共享规则（池系统）是否可以在渔业资源联合开发问题中实现帕累托效率。当主体自私时，均衡状态下个体输出的同质性是有效池化系统的必要条件。当代理人表现出对地位的偏好（即成为群体中表现良好的成员之一）时，即使没有这种条件，池系统也可以是有效的。这是因为，一方面，相对地位的考虑扩大了异质性的容忍范围，另一方面，它产生了一种可能使个人产出表现同质化的激励结构。 (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. 保留所有权利。
We study whether a linear income sharing rule (pooling system) can achieve Pareto efficiency in a problem of joint exploitation of fishery resources. When agents are selfish, the homogeneity of individual outputs in equilibrium is a necessary condition for the efficient pooling system. When agents exhibit a preference for status (i.e. for being among the well-performing members of the group), the pooling system can be efficient even without this condition. This is because, on the one hand, relative status considerations enlarge the tolerable range of heterogeneity and, on the other hand, it generates an incentive structure that may homogenise individual output performances. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.