Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking
Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.4.1206
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发表时间：
2007-11
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hikaru Ogawa;D. Wildasin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hikaru Ogawa;D. Wildasin
在本文中，我们分析了一类模型，其中存在不同司法管辖区之间的跨司法管辖区溢出，例如影响全球环境的二氧化碳排放。每个司法管辖区的排放量取决于当地私人资本的存量。资本是跨司法管辖区流动的，可能会被征税，以帮助为地方公共支出提供资金。我们表明，在重要情况下，即使在完全没有上级政府的纠正干预或通过科亚讨价还价协调政策的情况下，分散决策也会导致有效的资源分配。特别是，即使代理人之间的偏好和生产技术不同，分散的系统仍然可以导致全球有效的分配。
In this paper, we analyze a class of models in which there are interjurisdictional spillovers among heterogeneous jurisdictions, as illustrated for instance by CO2 emissions that affect the global environment. Each jurisdiction’s emissions depend upon the local stock of private capital. Capital is interjurisdictionally-mobile and may be taxed to help finance local public expenditures. We show that decentralized policymaking leads to efficient resource allocations in important cases, even in the complete absence of corrective interventions by higher-level governments or coordination of policy through Coasian bargaining. In particular, even when the preferences and production technologies differ among the agents, the decentralized system can still result in globally efficient allocation.