What Contracts Can't Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons

What Contracts Can't Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons
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合同不能做什么:私人订购在促进知识共享方面的局限性

DOI:
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发表时间:
2005
期刊:
IO: Firm Structure
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
N. Elkin
N. Elkin
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
N. Elkin

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Creative Commons是一个非营利性的美国组织,运营一个许可平台,以促进创意作品的免费使用。这个想法是为了在慷慨的许可条款下促进创造性作品的发布,使作品可用于共享和重用。知识共享倡导以一种颠覆性的方式使用版权,最终改变其含义。本文对这一有价值的追求持怀疑态度。虽然我同意知识共享对版权原教旨主义的关注,这不可避免地导致一切有价值的财产化,但我更怀疑它的战略。本文探讨了知识共享的法律的策略,并分析了它在促进创造性作品的共享、分发和(再)使用方面的潜力。知识共享作为一种社会运动,为广泛的意识形态创造了一个平台,这些意识形态都对提高作品的获取感兴趣。事实证明,这对一个寻求获得更广泛公众支持的社会运动来说是一个巨大的优势。知识共享的法律的策略反映了最低的公分母:授权所有者管理他们的创造性作品。然而,与此同时,知识共享缺乏对信息社会的全面愿景,也缺乏对开放获取创造性作品的先决条件的共同定义。最终的结果是意识形态的混乱。本文分析了知识共享利用知识产权颠覆版权的战略选择。分析表明,在缺乏自由获取的共同意识的情况下,对产权的依赖可能只会加强创造性作品的所有权制度。它可以加强作为概念框架的财产话语,并作为管理信息使用的监管计划。意识形态的混乱可能进一步导致契约的泛滥。知识共享的战略预先假定,最大限度地减少外部信息成本对于增加对创造性作品的访问至关重要。然而,缺乏标准化增加了获得创造性作品的成本,并可能进一步加强版权法的寒蝉效应。本文认为,创建一个替代版权可能需要标准化。为了取得成功,知识共享必须以所有者的主权为代价,以降低交易成本,从而增加对创造性作品的获取。
Creative Commons is a non-profit U.S. based organization that operates a licensing platform to promote free use of creative works. The idea is to facilitate the release of creative works under generous license terms that would make works available for sharing and reuse. Creative Commons advocates the use of copyrights in a rather subversive way that would ultimately change their meaning. The paper expresses a skeptical view of this worthy pursuit. While I share Creative Commons' concern with copyright fundamentalism, which inevitably leads to the propertization of everything of value, I am more skeptical of its strategy. The paper explores the legal strategy of Creative Commons and analyzes its potential for enhancing the sharing, distribution and (re)use of creative works. Creative Commons as a social movement creates a platform for a wide range of ideologies that share an interest in enhancing access to works. This turns out to be a great advantage for a social movement that is seeking to gain a wider public support. Creative Commons' legal strategy reflects the lowest common denominator: empowering owners to govern their creative works. At the same time, however, Creative Commons lacks a comprehensive vision of the information society and a shared definition of the prerequisites for open access to creative works. The end result is ideological fuzziness. The paper examines the strategic choice of Creative Commons to rely on property rights in its effort to subvert the meaning of copyright. The analysis shows that reliance on property rights, in the absence of a shared sense of free access, may simply strengthen the proprietary regime in creative works. It may reinforce the property discourse as a conceptual framework and as a regulatory scheme for governing the use of information. The fuzziness of ideology may further lead to the proliferation of contracts. Creative Commons' strategy presupposes that minimizing external information costs is critical for enhancing access to creative works. The lack of standardization increases, however, the cost of accessing creative works, and may further enhance the chilling effect of copyright law. The paper argues that creating an alternative to copyright may require standardization. To become successful, Creative Commons would have to trade the sovereignty of owners for the reduction of transaction cost that would enhance access to creative works.