Monotone equilibria in signaling games
Monotone equilibria in signaling games
复制标题
信号博弈中的单调均衡
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103408
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发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
H. Pei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shuo Liu;H. Pei
在信号博弈中，我们考察了发送者的均衡策略相对于她的类型的单调性。我们证明，当发送者从接收者的行动中返回取决于她的类型时，Spence-Mirrlees条件不能排除高类型的发送者选择严格低于低类型的行动的均衡。我们给出了所有均衡是单调的充分条件，这些条件要求发送者的收益在她的行动中是递减的，在接收者的行动中是递增的，并且在她的类型和行动轮廓之间具有严格增加的差异。我们将我们的充分条件应用于教育信号、广告和保修条款。
We examine the monotonicity of the sender’s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games. We show that when the sender’s return from the receiver’s action depends on her type, the Spence–Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher-type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower-type. We provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone, which require that the sender’s payoff is decreasing in her action, is increasing in the receiver’s action, and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile. We apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling, advertising, and warranty provision.