Assertion, Knowledge, and Context

Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
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断言、知识和背景

DOI:
10.1215/00318108-111-2-167
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发表时间:
2002
期刊:
The Philosophical Review
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Keith DeRose
Keith DeRose
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Keith DeRose

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所讨论的立场都位于认识论和语言哲学的重叠领域,并且近年来都受到了广泛的关注。但更令人惊讶的是,我们还没有采取更多措施将它们聚集在一起。语境主义的主要问题是担心语境主义者将知识归因的保证可断言条件的可变性误认为是其真实条件的可变性。这强烈表明,对语境主义的认真评估需要敏锐地审视说话者需要什么才能做出有根据的断言的问题。事实证明,断言的知识解释——根据它,一个人能够断言的就是一个人所知道的——有望为这个问题的答案提供很大且重要的部分。事实证明,断言的知识解释解决了语境主义面临的最紧迫的问题,除此之外,还为语境主义提供了强有力的积极论据。或者说我会这么认为。要揭示语境主义最紧迫的问题需要做一些工作,因为语境主义的批评者本身并不太擅长识别它。在第一部分中,在简要解释语境主义之后,我将提出它的主要问题——我称之为“普遍性反对”——并说明为什么这是一个如此严重的问题。在第二部分中,在简要解释断言的知识说明和支持它的理由之后,我将展示它对语境主义的需求,并提出它为语境主义提供的积极论证。在第三部分中,我将使用断言的知识解释来压制普遍性异议,并且还将为反语境主义的前景蒙上其他阴影。
The positions under discussion are both located in the area of overlap between epistemology and the philosophy of language, and they have both received a good deal of attention in recent years. But there is further reason for surprise that more has not been done to bring them together. The chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth conditions. This strongly suggests that a serious assessment of contextualism will demand a discerning look at the question of what it takes for a speaker to make a warranted assertion. And it turns out that the knowledge account of assertion-according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows-promises to provide a large and important part of the answer to this question. It also turns out that the knowledge account of assertion dissolves the most pressing problem confronting contextualism and, on top of that, provides a powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism. Or so I will argue. It will take a bit of work to uncover contextualism's most pressing problem, since the critics of contextualism have not themselves been very proficient in identifying it. In part 1, then, after briefly explaining contextualism, I will present its main problem-the "Generality Objection," as I will call it-and show why this is such a serious concern. In part 2, after the knowledge account of assertion and the grounds that support it have been briefly explained, I will show its need for contextualism and present the positive argument for contextualism that it provides. In part 3, I will use the knowledge account of assertion to squash the Generality Objection and will also cast other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.