Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
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断言、知识和背景
DOI:
10.1215/00318108-111-2-167
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发表时间:
2002
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Keith DeRose
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Keith DeRose
The positions under discussion are both located in the area of overlap between epistemology and the philosophy of language, and they have both received a good deal of attention in recent years. But there is further reason for surprise that more has not been done to bring them together. The chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of warranted assertability of knowledge attributions for a variability in their truth conditions. This strongly suggests that a serious assessment of contextualism will demand a discerning look at the question of what it takes for a speaker to make a warranted assertion. And it turns out that the knowledge account of assertion-according to which what one is in a position to assert is what one knows-promises to provide a large and important part of the answer to this question. It also turns out that the knowledge account of assertion dissolves the most pressing problem confronting contextualism and, on top of that, provides a powerful positive argument in favor of contextualism. Or so I will argue. It will take a bit of work to uncover contextualism's most pressing problem, since the critics of contextualism have not themselves been very proficient in identifying it. In part 1, then, after briefly explaining contextualism, I will present its main problem-the "Generality Objection," as I will call it-and show why this is such a serious concern. In part 2, after the knowledge account of assertion and the grounds that support it have been briefly explained, I will show its need for contextualism and present the positive argument for contextualism that it provides. In part 3, I will use the knowledge account of assertion to squash the Generality Objection and will also cast other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.