Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models
Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models
复制标题
没有标准模型的真理理论
DOI：
10.1023/a:1011950105814
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
H. Leitgeb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Leitgeb
本文讨论语义封闭语言的公理真值理论类，其中该理论不允许标准模型；即，这些理论不能被解释为仅指句子的自然数码(有关公理真值理论的概述，请参见Halbach[6])。我们将对这一领域中的两个著名结果给出新的证明，并证明关于某一真理理论的非标准性的一个新定理。结果表明，所有关于这类理论的非规范性定理的证明策略“本质上”是同一种结构的。
This papers deals with the class of axiomatic theories of truth for semantically closed languages, where the theories do not allow for standard models; i.e., those theories cannot be interpreted as referring to the natural number codes of sentences only (for an overview of axiomatic theories of truth in general, see Halbach[6]). We are going to give new proofs for two well-known results in this area, and we also prove a new theorem on the nonstandardness of a certain theory of truth. The results indicate that the proof strategies for all the theorems on the nonstandardness of such theories are "essentially" of the same kind of structure.