Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles
Making rules credible: divided government and political budget cycles
复制标题
使规则可信：政府和政治预算周期的划分
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gustavo Torrens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jorge M. Streb;Gustavo Torrens
政治预算周期（PBC）可能是由办公室驱动的现任者在信息不对称下面临的可信度问题造成的，因为他们有操纵财政政策以增加选举机会的诱惑。我们分析了限制公共债务的规则的作用，因为借贷是中国人民银行总量的必要条件。由于立法机关通常必须批准新债务，分裂的政府可以使这些财政规则变得可信。统一政府或预算法不完全遵守会削弱承诺，这有助于解释为什么人民银行在发展中国家和新兴民主国家更强大。当分裂的政府影响效率时，选民必须在选举扭曲和政府能力之间进行权衡。
Political budget cycles (PBCs) can result from the credibility problems office-motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information, due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances. We analyze the role of rules that limit public debt, because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate PBCs. Since the legislature must typically authorize new debt, divided government can make these fiscal rules credible. Commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law, which can help explain why PBCs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies. When divided government affects efficiency, voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence.