A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty
A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks Under Uncertainty
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-63086-7_14
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发表时间：
2020-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Zhifan Xu;M. Baykal-Gursoy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhifan Xu;M. Baykal-Gursoy
考虑的是一个多信道的无线网络的秘密通信，使用的信号干扰加噪声比（SINR）作为性能指标。窃听者可以通过每个合法的发送器-接收器通信对的降级信道来截取编码的消息。另一方面，友好的干扰者可以发送合作干扰信号以增强整个网络的保密性能。此外，窃听信道的状态信息可能不完全已知。发送者和友好的窃听者必须合作决定最佳的干扰功率分配策略，该策略平衡了保密性能和使用故意干扰的成本，而窃听者试图最大化她的窃听容量。为了解决这个问题，我们提出并分析了网络防御者和窃听者之间的非零和博弈，窃听者只能攻击有限数量的信道。我们证明了局中人的纳什均衡策略是门限型的。我们提出了一个算法来找到均衡策略对。数值例子证明了均衡，并将其与基线策略进行对比。
Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while the eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero sum game between the network defender and the eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to baseline strategies.