Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core
Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core
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信息不完整、可信度与核心
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.724145
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Vohra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bhaskar Dutta;R. Vohra
对于一个信息不完全的经济体来说，一个合适的（临时的）核心概念取决于联盟可以共享的信息量。Wilson（1978）最初定义的粗核和细核分别对应两种极端情况，即不涉及信息共享和任意信息共享。我们提出了一个新的核心概念，可信核心，它包含了激励兼容性约束，并基于这样一种观点，即联盟可以协调其对现状的潜在反对，而这些反对可以从正在考虑的反对的性质中可靠地推断出来。我们提供了充分的条件，保证可靠芯的不空性。
An appropriate (interim) notion of the core for an economy with incomplete information depends on the amount of information that coalitions can share. The coarse and fine core, as originally defined by Wilson (1978), correspond to two polar cases, involving no information sharing and arbitrary information sharing, respectively. We propose a new core notion, the credible core, which incorporates incentive compatibility constraints, and is based on the idea that a coalition can coordinate its potential objection to a status-quo over an event that can be credibly inferred from the nature of the objection being contemplated. We provide sufficient conditions ensuring non-emptiness of the credible core.