Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities and Section Five Enforcement Powers
Re-Readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities and Section Five Enforcement Powers
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重读和误读：屠宰场、特权或豁免以及第五节执行权
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.354081
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Fox
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Fox
本文具有两层含义：一方面，它回应了最近对米勒大法官在屠宰场案中观点的修正主义重读；另一方面，它寻求最高法院最近判决所激发的第十四修正案判例的两个领域之间的历史联系。关于后一点，我认为第十四修正案的框架和早期适用的历史背景揭示了对特权或豁免条款（法院在萨恩斯诉罗伊案中暗示的问题）的正确解释与第五节下的国会执行权（法院在伯恩市及其后续案件中积极解决的问题）之间存在密切而本质的联系。文章的结构如下：第一部分批评屠宰场修正主义者，认为他们对米勒法官关于纳入《权利法案》问题的意见提供了过于仁慈的解读。第二部分探讨了国会关于修正案的辩论和同时国会立法（例如 1866 年的《民权法案》和《弗里德曼局法案》）的历史证据，然后批评修正主义者隐含地采用了米勒对联邦公民特权的反自然权利解释。第三部分主要通过仔细阅读整个重建期间的一些国会行动，包括《反劳工法》、《1871 年执行（反三K党）法》和《1875 年民权法》，阐述了国会解释执行特权和豁免条款的权力。本部分认为，国会对特权或豁免条款及其自身权力采取了相当广泛的看法。在最高法院对《屠宰场》案作出裁决之前，《屠宰场》将国会的讨论从对该条款的更广泛、基本权利的解释转向更受限制的权利平等解释。最后，第四部分讨论了对国会发展特权或豁免条款的最后一击，即民权案件。本文建议，如果国会确实应该在制定特权或豁免条款的轮廓方面发挥重要作用，那么国会基于其对该条款的理解而采取的行动应该比法院目前给予的更多尊重。通过重新统一对特权或豁免条款和执行条款的历史理解，现代解释者可能会为国会保护妇女、残疾人和宗教少数群体等群体权利的行动找到一个看似合理但被忽视的宪法基础。
This Article wears two hats: on the one hand it responds to recent revisionist re-readings of Justice Miller's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, and on the other hand it seeks a historical connection between two areas of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence invigorated by recent Supreme Court decisions. On the latter point I argue that the historical background of the framing and early application of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals an intimate and essential connection between the proper interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (an issue hinted at by the Court in Saenz v. Roe) and congressional enforcement powers under Section Five (an issue actively addressed by the Court in City of Boerne and its progeny). The Article's architecture is as follows: Part One critiques the Slaughter-House revisionists, arguing that they provide an overly charitable reading of Justice Miller's opinion on the question of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Part Two explores the historical evidence from congressional debates about the Amendment and simultaneous congressional legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Freedman's Bureau Act and then critiques the revisionists' implicit adoption of Miller's anti-natural rights interpretation of federal citizenship privileges. Part Three develops the idea of the congressional power of interpretive enforcement of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, primarily through a close reading of some of the congressional actions throughout Reconstruction, including the Anti-Peonage Act, the Enforcement (Anti-Klan) Act of 1871 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This Part argues that Congress took a fairly broad view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its own powers prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Slaughter-House, and that Slaughter-House re-directed congressional discourse away from a more expansive, fundamental rights interpretation of the Clause and toward a more constrained equality-of-rights interpretation. Finally, Part Four discusses the final blow to congressional development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Civil Rights Cases. This Article suggests that if it is true that Congress should play an important role in developing the contours of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, then actions by Congress which are based on its understanding of the Clause should be accorded more deference than currently granted by Court. By re-uniting the historical understandings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Enforcement Clause modern interpreters might find a plausible but overlooked constitutional basis for congressional actions to protect the rights of groups such as women, the disabled, and religious minorities.