Social Contracts for Non-Cooperative Games
Social Contracts for Non-Cooperative Games
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DOI：
10.1145/3375627.3375829
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发表时间：
2020-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alan Davoust;Michael Rovatsos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alan Davoust;Michael Rovatsos
在未来的代理社会中，我们可能会看到人工智能系统从事自私的、有计划的行为，促进其所有者的利益，而不是社会期望的结果。在这种情况下，我们如何促进道德健全的行为，以获得更理想的结果？道德哲学的一个解决方案是社会契约的概念，这是一套人们自愿遵守的规则，以获得比无政府状态带来的更好的结果。我们将这一概念应用到博弈论中，系统地修改非合作博弈的收益，使代理人理性地追求社会期望的结果。我们表明，对于任何游戏，一个合适的社会契约都可以被设计为产生社会福利方面的最佳结果。然后，我们研究了将这种方法应用于其他道德目标的局限性，并确定，对于任何与社会福利显著不同的其他道德目标，存在与集体自私行为相比，没有这种社会契约将是可行的游戏，产生不可忽略的社会利益。
In future agent societies, we might see AI systems engaging in selfish, calculated behavior, furthering their owners' interests instead of socially desirable outcomes. How can we promote morally sound behaviour in such settings, in order to obtain more desirable outcomes? A solution from moral philosophy is the concept of a social contract, a set of rules that people would voluntarily commit to in order to obtain better outcomes than those brought by anarchy. We adapt this concept to a game-theoretic setting, to systematically modify the payoffs of a non-cooperative game, so that agents will rationally pursue socially desirable outcomes. We show that for any game, a suitable social contract can be designed to produce an optimal outcome in terms of social welfare. We then investigate the limitations of applying this approach to alternative moral objectives, and establish that, for any alternative moral objective that is significantly different from social welfare, there are games for which no such social contract will be feasible that produces non-negligible social benefit compared to collective selfish behaviour.