Arbitrary reference
Arbitrary reference
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发表时间：
2012
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通讯作者：
Ofra Magidor
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作者：
W. Breckenridge;Ofra Magidor
推理的两个基本规则是普遍概括和存在实例化。这些规则的应用包括规定（即使只是隐含的），如“让n是一个任意的数字”或“让约翰是一个任意的法国人”。然而，这些规定背后的语义远不清楚。例如，在n为任意数的条件下，n表示什么？在本文中，我们认为‘ n ’指的是一个数——一个普通的、特殊的数，如58或2,345,043。哪一个?我们不知道也不可能知道，因为n的参考值是任意固定的。这个建议的基础是一个更普遍的论点：任意引用（AR）：可以任意地固定表达式的引用。当我们这样做时，表达式接收到其普通类型的语义值，尽管我们不知道也不可能知道它接收到的具体是哪个值。我们在本文中的目标是捍卫AR。特别是，我们认为AR可以用来提供即时推理的解释（比突出的替代方案更好），我们建议AR也可以为一系列困难的哲学难题提供新的解决方案。
Two fundamental rules of reasoning are Universal Generalisation and Existential Instantiation. Applications of these rules involve stipulations (even if only implicitly) such as ‘Let n be an arbitrary number’ or ‘Let John be an arbitrary Frenchman’. Yet the semantics underlying such stipulations are far from clear. What, for example, does ‘n’ refer to following the stipulation that n be an arbitrary number? In this paper, we argue that ‘n’ refers to a number—an ordinary, particular number such as 58 or 2,345,043. Which one? We do not and cannot know, because the reference of ‘n’ is fixed arbitrarily. Underlying this proposal is a more general thesis:Arbitrary Reference (AR): It is possible to fix the reference of an expression arbitrarily. When we do so, the expression receives its ordinary kind of semantic-value, though we do not and cannot know which value in particular it receives.Our aim in this paper is defend AR. In particular, we argue that AR can be used to provide an account of instantial reasoning (one that is better than the prominent alternatives), and we suggest that AR can also figure in offering new solutions to a range of difficult philosophical puzzles.