V—Dimensions of Demandingness
V—Dimensions of Demandingness
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V——要求的维度
DOI：
10.1093/arisoc/aow003
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.7
通讯作者：
Fiona Woollard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fiona Woollard
要求性反对是这样一种反对，即一种道德理论或原则是不可接受的，因为它要求的比我们合理期望的要多。大卫·索贝尔（David Sobel）、雪莱·卡根（Shelley Kagan）和利亚姆·墨菲（Liam Murphy）都认为，要求性反对隐含地（并且没有正当理由）呼吁不同类型成本之间的道德差异。我讨论了三组情况下，每一个都表明，我们隐含地假设成本之间的一些区别时，应用需求反对。我们可以解释每一组案例，但每一组案例都需要诉诸需求性异议的一个单独维度。
The Demandingness Objection is the objection that a moral theory or principle is unacceptable because it asks more than we can reasonably expect. David Sobel, Shelley Kagan and Liam Murphy have each argued that the Demandingness Objection implicitly – and without justification – appeals to moral distinctions between different types of cost. I discuss three sets of cases each of which suggest that we implicitly assume some distinction between costs when applying the Demandingness Objection. We can explain each set of cases, but each set requires appeal to a separate dimension of the Demandingness Objection.