Verification of Authentication Protocols Based on the Binding Relation
Verification of Authentication Protocols Based on the Binding Relation
复制标题
基于绑定关系的认证协议验证
DOI：
10.1007/3-540-36532-x_19
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Takamichi Saito
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Hagiya;Ryo Takemura;Koichi Takahashi;Takamichi Saito
认证协议的正确性尤其基于在协议执行过程中建立的随机数和数据之间的关系。在本文中，我们制定了一个推理系统，推导出的秘密的nonces和绑定nonces和数据的关系。通过使用推理规则直接导出绑定关系，可以很容易地证明协议的正确性。根据情况，也可以通过简单地添加新的推理规则来扩展推理系统。我们给出了一些示例协议，其正确性只能使用一些条件的nonce，制定为额外的推理规则。
The correctness of an authentication protocol is based on, among others, the relation between nonces and data that is established in the course of execution of the protocol. In this paper, we formulate an inference system that derives the secrecy of nonces and the relation that binds nonces and data. It is easy to show the correctness of a protocol by directly deriving the binding relation using the inference rules. Depending on situations, it is also possible to extend the inference system by simply adding new inference rules. We give some example protocols whose correctness can only be shown using some conditions on nonces that are formulated as additional inference rules.