A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states
A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states
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DOI：
10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7585
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发表时间：
2010-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jianbing Ma;Weiru Liu;S. Benferhat
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jianbing Ma;Weiru Liu;S. Benferhat
当收到新的证据（无论是命题公式的形式还是一组解释的总预购的形式）时，信念修正对行为人的信念进行信念改变。杰弗里规则通常用于修正新信息在概率上不确定时的概率认知状态。在本文中，我们提出了一个普遍的认识修正框架，其中新的证据是部分认识状态的形式。我们的框架扩展了杰弗里的不确定输入规则，并涵盖了众所周知的现有框架，如有序条件函数（OCF）或可能性理论。然后我们定义了这些修正算子必须满足的一组公设，并建立了表征这些公设的表示定理。这些假设揭示了现有各种复习策略的共同特征，并被OCF条件化、杰弗里条件化规则和可能性条件化所满足。此外，当简化到信念修正情境时，我们的假设可以归纳出达尔文和珀尔的大部分假设。
Belief revision performs belief change on an agent's beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey's rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey's rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey's rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce most of Darwiche and Pearl's postulates.