Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort?
Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort?
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DOI：
10.1023/a:1008729115022
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发表时间：
1999-06-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Salanié, F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jullien, B;Salanié, B;Salanié, F
考虑一个面临风险损失分布的代理人，他可以通过施加一些努力来改变这种分布。当他变得更加厌恶风险时，他是否应该付出更多的努力？例如，我们是否应该期望更多的风险厌恶型司机更谨慎地驾驶？本文利用Jewitt（1989）给出的结果，给出了正解的充分条件。我们首先扩展了自我保险和自我保护的标准模型，并表明比较静态只取决于努力对净损失的影响。然后，我们提出的条件与应用程序的连续情况。
Consider an agent facing a risky distribution of losses who can change this distribution by exerting some effort. Should he exert more effort when he becomes more risk-averse? For instance, should we expect more risk-averse drivers to drive more cautiously? In this article, we give sufficient conditions under which the answer is positive, using results presented in Jewitt (1989). We first extend the standard models of self-insurance and self-protection and show that the comparative statics depends only on the effect of effort on the net loss. We then present conditions for the continuous case with applications.