Strategic delegation : An experiment
Strategic delegation : An experiment
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战略授权：一个实验
DOI：
10.2307/2696414
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
U. Gneezy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Fershtman;U. Gneezy
我们在一个简单的最后通牒博弈实验中考察了战略授权的效果。具体来说，我们表明，当提议者使用代表时，他的份额会增加。由于在这种情况下，提议者并不使用委托作为一种承诺手段，这一效应为委托现象提供了另一种解释。当委托是强制性的或可选的时，这个结果成立。我们还表明，未观察到的代表团的响应者减少了他的份额，因为他的代表被认为是更愿意接受坚韧的报价。2001年版权归兰德公司所有。
We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his share increases. Since in such a case the proposer does not use the delegate as a commitment device, this effect identifies an additional explanation of the delegation phenomenon. This result holds when delegation is mandatory or optional. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces his share as his delegate is perceived to be more willing to accept tough offers. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.