Kenya's 2017 elections: winner-takes-all politics as usual?
Kenya's 2017 elections: winner-takes-all politics as usual?
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DOI：
10.1080/17531055.2019.1594072
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发表时间：
2019-04-03
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Willis, Justin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cheeseman, Nic;Kanyinga, Karuti;Willis, Justin
肯尼亚2017年大选告诉我们，新宪法有能力减少政治竞争的风险和政治不稳定的前景。三项宪法改革尤其重要：总统选举门槛为50% + 1;权力下放到47个县政府;以及设立有权审理总统选举请愿书的最高法院。我们发现，2010年宪法的影响好坏参半。50%加1的门槛鼓励了联盟的形成，但这种动态长期以来一直很明显。权力下放使更多的肯尼亚人在这个系统中有了利益，但也创造了新的结构，可以用来引导反对国家的异议。最高法院显示了它作为一个独立机构的能力，但在维持选举合法性方面几乎无所作为。事实上，尽管2010年宪法明显重塑了政治格局，但结束选举后僵局的是一项个人交易。因此，选举表明，单靠正式机构是无法改变政治逻辑的，并揭示了个别政治家和非正式机构的持续重要性，这些机构可能与正式机构竞争或相互补充。
This article asks what Kenya's 2017 general elections tell us about the capacity of a new constitution to reduce the stakes of political competition and prospects of political instability. Three constitutional changes are particularly important: the adoption of a 50% + 1 threshold for the presidential election; the devolution of power to 47 county governments; and the introduction of a Supreme Court with the right to hear presidential electoral petitions. We find that the impact of the 2010 constitution has been mixed. The 50% plus 1 threshold encouraged coalition formation, but this dynamic has long been evident. Devolution has given a wider set of Kenyans a stake in the system, but has also created new structures that can be used to channel dissent against the state. The Supreme Court demonstrated its capacity to act as an independent institution, but did little to sustain electoral legitimacy. Indeed, while the 2010 constitution has clearly reshaped the political landscape, it was a personal deal that ended the post-election impasse. The elections therefore demonstrate how formal institutions alone cannot change political logics and reveal the continued significance of individual politicians and informal institutions that may compete with or complement their formal counterparts.