Incentive Mechanism Design for Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Copiers
Incentive Mechanism Design for Truth Discovery in Crowdsourcing With Copiers
复制标题
复印机众包真相发现激励机制设计
DOI：
10.1109/tsc.2021.3075741
复制
发表时间：
2022-09-01
影响因子：
8.1
通讯作者：
Xu, Lijie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jiang, Lingyun;Niu, Xiaofu;Xu, Lijie
众包已经成为一种有效的工具，利用人类的智慧来执行对机器来说具有挑战性的任务。人们已经提出了许多用于众包的真相发现方法和激励机制。然而，他们中的大多数人无法处理与复制者的众包，复制者从其他工作人员那里复制部分（或全部）数据。本文旨在设计文本答案真相发现的众包激励机制。提出了社会福利最大化的问题，使得所有任务都能以最小的置信度完成，并设计了一个三阶段的激励机制。在上下文嵌入和聚类阶段，我们在语义层面上构建和聚类文本众包答案的内容向量表示。在真值发现阶段，我们根据工作者的依赖性和准确性来估计每个任务的真值。在反向拍卖阶段，我们设计了一个贪婪算法来选择赢家和确定支付。通过严格的理论分析和大量的模拟，我们证明了所提出的机制实现计算效率，个人的理性，真实性，并保证近似。此外，当众包系统中存在复制者时，我们的真相发现方法在精确度方面表现出显著的优势。
Crowdsourcing has become an effective tool to utilize human intelligence to perform tasks that are challenging for machines. Many truth discovery methods and incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been proposed. However, most of them cannot deal with the crowdsourcing with copiers, who copy a part (or all) of data from other workers. This article aims at designing crowdsourcing incentive mechanism for truth discovery of textual answers with copiers. We formulate the problem of maximizing the social welfare such that all tasks can be completed with the least confidence for truth discovery and design an three-stage incentive mechanism. In contextual embedding and clustering stage, we construct and cluster the content vector representations of textual crowdsourced answers at the semantic level. In truth discovery stage, we estimate the truth for each task based on the dependence and accuracy of workers. In reverse auction stage, we design a greedy algorithm to select the winners and determine the payment. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and guaranteed approximation. Moreover, our truth discovery methods show prominent advantage in terms of precision when there are copiers in the crowdsourcing systems.