How Economists and Physicians Trade Off Efficiency and Equity in Medically and Neutrally Framed Allocation Problems ? ♣
How Economists and Physicians Trade Off Efficiency and Equity in Medically and Neutrally Framed Allocation Problems ? ♣
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经济学家和医生如何在医疗和中立框架分配问题中权衡效率和公平？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Felder
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Marlies Ahlert;Martin;S. Felder
本实验研究了经济学家和医生治疗病人的社会偏好和选择，并将这些选择与一个一致的中性框架分配问题进行了比较。潜在的受益人在其最低需求以及从受益中获利的能力方面各不相同。利用理论解，我们将分销商分为自私型、罗尔斯型和最大化接收者数量型。结果表明，经济学家倾向于自私，而医生的选择更符合最大化的受援国和罗尔斯主义。关于框架，我们观察到，专业规范在熟悉的环境中表现得更清楚。最后，我们测试的假设如何被送达的概率和分配的数量取决于收件人的特性，以及对类型的分销商。JEL分类：A13，I19，C91，C72
This experiment investigates the social preferences and choices of economists and physicians for treating patients and compares the choices with those in a congruent neutrally framed allocation problem. The potential recipients differ with respect to their minimum needs as well as to their ability to profit from the receipt. Using the theoretical solutions, we classify the distributors as selfish, Rawlsian or maximizing the number of recipients. The results indicate that economists tend towards selfishness whereas the choices of physicians are more in line with maximizing the number of recipients and Rawlsianism. Regarding framing, we observe that professional norms show up more clearly in the familiar settings. We finally test hypotheses regarding how the probability of being served and the allocated quantity depend on a recipient’s characteristics as well as on the type of distributor. JEL Classification: A13, I19, C91, C72