Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules
Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules
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主导策略的采用和投标人对定价规则的体验
DOI：
10.1007/bf01669775
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发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Ronald M. Harstad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ronald M. Harstad
真实披露是英语（口头升序出价）和第二价格密封出价私人价值拍卖中的主导策略。英国拍卖的受控观察在很大程度上与主导策略预测一致，但实验室二价拍卖表现出大量且持续的出价过高，即使有先前的经验也是如此。然而，在英国拍卖中出价的经验具有显着的学习效果，使随后的第二价格拍卖中的出价更接近占优策略。我探讨了两种处理方法，分别从英国拍卖参与中吸取的教训中分离出各个方面，从而得出以下结论。部分教训似乎是在逐一考虑价格，但大部分似乎是粗略地认识到出价过高会导致损失。英国拍卖经验教会受试者认识到二价拍卖中的主导策略的说法似乎过于乐观。当正态分布误差的假设不成立时，我引入了一种非参数技术来测试系数限制。版权所有 Kluwer 学术出版社 2000
Truthful revelation is a dominant strategy in both English (oral ascending bid) and second-price sealed-bid private-values auctions. Controlled observations of English auctions are largely consistent with the dominant strategy prediction, but laboratory second-price auctions exhibit substantial and persistent overbidding, even with prior experience. However, the experience of having bid in an English auction has a significant learning effect, moving bidding in subsequent second-price auctions closer to the dominant strategy. I explore two treatments isolating facets of the lessons learned from English auction participation, leading me to the following conclusions. Part of the lesson carried over appears to be considering prices one-by-one, but most of it appears to be a crude awareness that overbidding leads to losses. A claim that English auction experience teaches subjects to recognize the dominant strategy in second-price auctions seems overly optimistic. I introduce a nonparametric technique to test coefficient restrictions when the assumption of normally distributed errors is untenable. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000