Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers
Leadership in Tax Competition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers
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DOI：
10.1515/bejeap-2017-0217
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发表时间：
2016-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Junichi Haraguchi;Hikaru Ogawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Junichi Haraguchi;Hikaru Ogawa
摘要本文提出了一个具有财政均等化方案的不对称税收竞争的时间博弈。研究发现，随着均等化转移规模的增大，政府倾向于进行序步博弈，这解释了税收竞争中税收领导者的出现。税收领导人的存在可能会加剧国家间的资本错配，这表明旨在缩小地区间财政差距的均衡转移可能会导致资本配置效率低下。
Abstract We propose a timing game of asymmetric tax competition with fiscal equalization scheme. The study finds that governments tend to play a sequential-move game as the scale of equalization transfer increases, which explains the emergence of tax leaders in tax competition. The presence of a tax leader is likely to exacerbate capital misallocation among countries, suggesting that equalization transfers aimed at narrowing the interregional fiscal gap might cause an inefficient capital allocation.