Information Acquisition, Price Informativeness, and Welfare
Information Acquisition, Price Informativeness, and Welfare
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信息获取、价格信息性和福利
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2516500
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jean
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rohit Rahi;Jean
我们考虑具有不同估值的风险资产的市场。经纪人拥有的关于他们自己估值的私人信息反映在均衡价格中。我们研究了在这种情况下出现的学习外部性，特别是它们对价格信息性和福利的影响。当私人信号嘈杂，使代理人更多地依赖于价格传达的信息时，阻碍信息收集的帕累托可能会有所改善。信息获取的互补性可能导致多重均衡。
We consider the market for a risky asset with heterogeneous valuations. Private information that agents have about their own valuation is reflected in the equilibrium price. We study the learning externalities that arise in this setting, and in particular their implications for price informativeness and welfare. When private signals are noisy, so that agents rely more on the information conveyed by prices, discouraging information gathering may be Pareto improving. Complementarities in information acquisition can lead to multiple equilibria.