Conditional Promises and Threats – Cognition and Emotion
Conditional Promises and Threats – Cognition and Emotion
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DOI：
10.4324/9781315782379-57
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发表时间：
2019
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通讯作者：
Sieghard Beller
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作者：
Sieghard Beller
有条件的承诺和威胁--认知和情感西格哈德·贝勒德国弗莱堡大学心理学系D-79085弗莱堡摘要有条件的承诺和威胁是可以用来操纵他人行为的言语行为。尽管推理研究已经能够揭示这些概念的一些特性，但解释仍然是零散的。为了填补这一空白，本文提出了条件诱因的理论分析，它综合了认知和情感两个方面。一项集中于语言、语用、情感和道义后果的实验证实了这一分析，并表明人们对条件诱因有清晰的理解。引言有条件的承诺和威胁是一个人所说的言语行为(Searle，1971)，目的是通过设定收件人的行为后果来操纵他的行为(参见。Conison，1997；von Wright，1962)。在放学步行回家的路上，亨利可能会向他的同学鲍勃提出以下建议：(1)“如果你把自行车借给我，我就帮你做作业。”鲍勃可以从这句话中推断亨利想借他的自行车，而且亨利认为他(鲍勃)需要亨利的帮助。对人类推理的研究通常集中在命题逻辑的规范框架内对条件承诺/威胁的推理使用：人们从条件论证中得出哪些推论？假设，(2)鲍勃把自行车借给亨利。那么(1)和(2)之后会发生什么呢？亨利会帮助鲍勃吗？-虽然我们不能确切地知道一个人实际上会采取什么行动，但我们希望亨利会帮助他，或者至少我们认为他将不得不这样做。这一答案在逻辑上得到了莫德斯波恩斯(MP)的支持。但是，如果(3)鲍勃不借出他的自行车，从承诺(1)应该得出什么结论？通常，人们的回答是亨利也不会帮助鲍勃。然而，这一推理对应于一种逻辑上无效的模式，即否认先行词(DA)。一般来说，有效的MP和MT以及无效的DA和AC更多地来自条件承诺和威胁，而不是普遍条件(例如，Fillenbaum，1978；Markovits&Lesage，1990；Newstead，Ellis，Evans，和Dennis，1997；但见Evans&Twyman-Musgrove，1998，不同的结果)。大多数人接受补充性条件句‘If Not-P，Then Not-Q’，因为它源于‘If P，Then Q’形式的诱导(Fillenbaum，1978)。Geis和Zwky(1971)在正常的语言用法中谈到了“受邀推理”。因此，关联的真值表通常反映的是一种等价关系，而不是一种暗示(Newstead等人，1997)。以这种方式处理条件诱因可以检测到不同命题内容对推理的影响，但这不足以解释背后的原因。在介绍性示例中进行DA推断的原因是什么？此外，简单的真值表分析过于局限，无法捕捉超出IF-THEN关系的条件诱因的概念性方面。例如，在某些情况下，为什么亨利有义务帮助鲍勃？如果亨利不帮鲍勃，鲍勃会有什么情绪反应？为了克服这些限制，本文进行了详细的理论分析。它在不同的层面上综合了几个方面：动机层面的目标和激励，语言层面的公式和推理，道义层面的义务和许可，语用层面的动作序列，以及情感层面的情感反应。多层次分析解释了在推理研究中观察到的现象；预测并实验证实了新的现象。条件诱因的水平(1)动机水平：分析的基本水平关注一个人发出诱因的动机情况。它是由期望、目标和激励决定的。说话人(S)希望受话人(A)对自己(S+：行为A)表现出某种目的行为(即，执行某一动作或不执行某一动作)，并对其自身(S+：行为A)具有积极的价值。在介绍性的例子中，是亨利想让鲍勃把他的自行车借给他。亨利必须预料到收信人不愿意自愿地表现出这种行为，否则就不需要引诱了。因此，说话人必须诱发一种行为改变：预期行为(灰色方框)S：说话人的目标S S这种改变可以通过两种方式激发：首先，说话人可以承诺奖励期望的目标行为或S+，给听话人带来积极的后果
Conditional Promises and Threats – Cognition and Emotion Sieghard Beller (beller@psychologie.uni-freiburg.de) Department of Psychology, University of Freiburg D-79085 Freiburg, Germany Abstract Conditional promises and threats are speech acts that can be used to manipulate the behavior of other persons. Although reasoning studies have been able to reveal some peculiarities of these concepts, the explanation has remained fragmentary. To fill in this gap, a theoretical analysis of conditional inducements is proposed, which integrates cognitive as well as emotional aspects. An experiment – focussing on linguistic, pragmatic, emo- tional, and deontic consequences – corroborates the anal- ysis and shows that persons have a clear understanding of conditional inducements. Introduction Conditional promises and threats are speech acts (Searle, 1971) uttered by a person to manipulate an addressee’s behavior by setting up consequences of his behavior (cf. Conison, 1997; von Wright, 1962). Walk- ing home from school, Henry may make the following proposal to his classmate Bob: (1) “If you lend me your bike, then I will help you with your homework”. Bob can infer from this statement that Henry would like to borrow his bike, and that Henry believes that he (Bob) needs Henry’s help. Research on human reasoning usually focusses on the inferential use of conditional promises/threats within the normative framework of propositional logic: Which inferences do people draw from conditional arguments? Suppose, (2) Bob lends Henry his bike. What follows then from (1) and (2)? Will Henry help Bob? – Although we cannot know for sure which action a person will actually take, we would expect that Henry will help him, or at least we think that he will have to. This answer is logically warranted by Modus Ponens (MP). But what should be concluded from the promise (1), if (3) Bob does not lend out his bike? Usually, persons answer that Henry will not help Bob either. This inference, however, corresponds to a logically invalid pattern known as Denial of the Antecedent (DA). In general, the valid MP and MT (Modus Tollens) as well as the invalid DA and AC (Affirmation of the Con- sequent) are drawn more frequently from conditional promises and threats than from universal conditionals (e.g., Fillenbaum, 1978; Markovits & Lesage, 1990; Newstead, Ellis, Evans, & Dennis, 1997; but see Evans & Twyman-Musgrove, 1998, for a diverging result). Most people accept the complementary conditional ‘If not-P, then not-Q’ as following from inducements of the form ‘If P, then Q’ (Fillenbaum, 1978). Geis and Zwicky (1971) speak of “invited inferences” in normal linguistic usage. Accordingly, the associated truth tables often reflect an equivalence relation instead of an impli- cation (Newstead et al., 1997). Treating conditional inducements in this way enables one to detect effects of different propositional contents on reasoning, but it is not sufficient to explain the under- lying causes. What is the reason for the DA inference in the introductory example? Furthermore, a simple truth- table analysis is much too restricted to capture concep- tual aspects of conditional inducements beyond the if- then relation. Why, for example, is Henry obliged to help Bob under certain circumstances? How will Bob react emotionally if Henry does not help him? A detailed theoretical analysis is presented to overcome these limi- tations. It integrates several aspects on different levels: goals and incentives on the motivational level, formula- tions and inferences on the linguistic level, obligation and permission on the deontic level, action sequences on the pragmatic level, and finally, affective reactions on the emotional level. The multi-level analysis explains the phenomena observed in reasoning studies; new phe- nomena are predicted and experimentally confirmed. Levels of Conditional Inducements (1) Motivational level: The basic level of analysis con- cerns the motivational situation in which a person utters an inducement. It is determined by expectations, goals and incentives. The speaker (S) wants an addressee (A) to show a certain goal-behavior (i.e., to perform a cer- tain action or to refrain from performing an action) with a positive value for himself, the speaker (S+: Behavior A ). In the introductory example, it was Henry who wanted Bob to lend him his bike. Henry must expect that the addressee is not willing to show this behavior voluntar- ily, otherwise an inducement would not be necessary. Thus, the speaker has to induce a behavioral change: Expected behavior (grey boxes) S–: ¬Behavior A Goal of the speaker S S+: Behavior A This change can be motivated in two ways: First, the speaker may promise to reward the desired goal behav- ior S+ with a positive consequence for the addressee