Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
复制标题
激励合同是否会排挤自愿合作？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Gächter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Fehr;S. Gächter
在本文中，我们提供的实验证据表明，激励契约可能导致互惠驱动的自愿合作的强烈挤出。这种挤出效应构成了激励措施的成本，而经济学家在很大程度上忽视了这一点。在我们的实验中，挤出效应非常强，以至于激励契约的效率低于没有任何激励的契约。然而，委托人更喜欢激励合同，因为它们允许他们在(较小的)总盈余中分得更大的份额，因此对他们来说更有利可图。
In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may cause a strong crowding out of reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation. This crowding out effect constitutes costs of incentive provision that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Principals, nonetheless, prefer the incentive contracts because they allow them to appropriate a much larger share of the (smaller) total surplus and are, hence, more profitable for them.