Private Versus State Ownership and Spillover of Investor Protection Standards in Interprovince Mergers: Evidence from China's Emerging Market
Private Versus State Ownership and Spillover of Investor Protection Standards in Interprovince Mergers: Evidence from China's Emerging Market
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DOI：
10.2753/ree1540-496x460606
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发表时间：
2010-11
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Hongbo Pan;Donghui Li;Xinping Xia;Minggui Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hongbo Pan;Donghui Li;Xinping Xia;Minggui Yu
本文考察了投资者保护标准对中国新兴市场省际并购的溢出效应。通过对372起并购案例的分析发现，如果收购方的省级投资者保护水平高于目标方，则民营收购方将获得显著更高的超额收益，而地方国有收购方则不会。另外的证据表明，与跨境收购者或私人收购者相比，跨省并购中的地方国有收购者来自财政状况较差的省份，并且更喜欢在投资者保护或财政状况较好的省份收购目标。
This paper examines the spillover effects of investor protection standards for interprovince mergers in China's emerging markets. Using a sample of 372 mergers, we find that if the provincial investor protection of the acquirer is better than that of the target, a privately owned acquirer will get significantly higher abnormal returns, whereas a local state-owned acquirer will not. Additional evidence indicates that in contrast to the crossborder acquirers or the private acquirers, the local state-owned acquirers in interprovince mergers come from provinces with worse fiscal conditions and prefer to acquire targets in provinces with better investor protection or fiscal conditions.