Repair Market Structure, Product Durability, and Monopoly
Repair Market Structure, Product Durability, and Monopoly
复制标题
维修市场结构、产品耐久性和垄断
DOI：
10.1111/1467-8454.00061
复制
发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hiroshi Kinokuni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hiroshi Kinokuni
本文认为，如果耐用品垄断者垄断了修理市场，那么它会使消费者选择低于社会最优水平的修理水平。这种失真是由于更换新旧商品的可能性以及维修决策的时间不一致问题造成的。然而，如果垄断者无法承诺维修价格，它可能会倾向于邀请竞争对手进入维修市场。如果维修市场是竞争的，即使产品市场是垄断的，也会选择社会最优的维修水平，从而也选择社会最优的耐久性水平。版权所有1999年，版权所有：Blackwell出版有限公司/阿德莱德大学和南澳大利亚州弗林德斯大学
This paper shows that a durable goods monopolist makes consumers choose a level of repairs which is below the socially optimal level if it monopolises the repair market as well. This distortion occurs due to the possibility of substituting new and used goods and a time inconsistency problem concerning repair decisions. However, if the monopolist is unable to commit the repair price, it may prefer to invite competitors into the repair market. If the repair market is competitive, even when the product market is monopolistic, the socially optimal level of repairs, and thus also the socially optimal durability level is chosen. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University of South Australia