Designing Monetary Policy Committees
Designing Monetary Policy Committees
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设计货币政策委员会
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2134983
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Volker Hahn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Volker Hahn
我们将委员会的货币政策制定纳入新凯恩斯主义模型，以评估委员会的制度特征对通货膨胀、产出和福利的影响。我们的分析提供了以下结果。首先，我们证明了委员会未来组成的透明度通常是有害的。第二，我们表明，央行短期导致有效的通货膨胀稳定的代价是高产出的变化。第三，规模较大的委员会通常可以更有效地稳定通货膨胀，但可能不太有效地稳定产出。第四，如果社会损失函数中产出稳定的权重较低，那么大型委员会和短期任期在社会上是可取的。第五，我们表明，一个中央银行家随机偏好可能是更可取的中央银行家谁分享社会的偏好。
We integrate monetary policy-making by committee into a New Keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee׳s institutional characteristics for inflation, output, and welfare. Our analysis delivers the following results. First, we demonstrate that transparency about the committee׳s future composition is typically harmful. Second, we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability. Third, larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization. Fourth, large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low. Fifth, we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society.