Democracy and Electoral Politics in Zambia
Democracy and Electoral Politics in Zambia
复制标题
赞比亚的民主和选举政治
DOI:
10.1163/9789004430440_004
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Banda T
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Banda T
In 2001, a new opposition party–the United Party for National Development (upnd)–narrowly lost the most competitive elections held in Zambia’s first decade of multi-party political competition. Following the death of the party’s president and a bruising succession battle, the party’s electoral fortunes then declined drastically. Having come to be seen as a ‘regional’party whose electoral support was strictly confined to its electoral stronghold of Southern Province, few analysts predicted the party’s spectacular resurgence in 2015. Despite the upnd’s existence as one of Zambia’s oldest (effective) political parties, it has not been the subject of academic inquiry. While scholars have analysed the tight election in 2001 in terms of the unpopularity of the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (mmd), resulting from factionalism, the bruising ‘thirdterm debate’and growing disenchantment with economic liberalization, no rigorous analysis was undertaken with regards to the policies or mobilization strategies of the upnd. In contrast, the rise of the next challenger to mmd hegemony, Michael Sata’s Patriotic Front (PF), which took power from the mmd in 2011, has been covered in substantial depth. Scholars have focused on the person of Michael Sata (Sishuwa, 2016), his infamous deployment of anti-Chinese rhetoric (Negi, 2008) and–most notably–the ‘populist’mobilization strategies employed by the party (Larmer and Fraser, 2007; Nic Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010; Resnick, 2013; Fraser, 2017). This chapter will briefly address the history of the upnd before outlining the reasons for the party’s surprising re-emergence as a national challenger, and how it came within inches of occupying State House. It argues that the party used the opportunities presented by factionalism in the mmd and PF, its two main competitors, to pull ethno-regional power brokers into an elite coalition and, in doing so, it allowed the party both to rebrand and to garner votes in regions outside of its traditional ethno-regional strongholds. This strategy was then bolstered by a highly targeted and effective election campaign waged across the country. This is not necessarily to argue that the upnd campaign attracted energetic and committed popular support. Instead, the party’s increasing vote share in 2015 and 2016 is also intimately connected to the collapse