Bundling and quality assurance
Bundling and quality assurance
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捆绑和质量保证
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12222
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Spier, Kathryn E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dana, Jr., James D.;Spier, Kathryn E.
由于私人监管不完善，销售两种体验商品的公司可以通过捆绑增加生产者剩余和消费者剩余。捆绑销售限制消费者购买两种产品，让消费者更好地了解情况，并确保他们使用更严厉的惩罚策略。加强监控和加大惩罚力度都会让其他消费者受益，因此捆绑销售克服了搭便车问题。如果消费者不能将负面信号归因于产生该产品的特定产品，或者两种商品中的一种是耐用品，另一种是互补的非耐用品，那么捆绑销售的社会价值甚至更大。我们的结果对于混合捆绑是稳健的。
With imperfect private monitoring, a firm selling two experience goods can increase both producer and consumer surplus by bundling. Bundling constrains consumers to buy two products, making consumers better informed and ensuring that they use tougher punishment strategies. Both increased monitoring and increased punishment benefit other consumers, so bundling overcomes a free‐rider problem. The social value of bundling is even larger if consumers cannot attribute a negative signal to the specific product that generated it, or if one of the two goods is a durable and the other is a complementary nondurable. Our results are robust to mixed bundling.