International lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation
International lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation
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DOI：
10.2307/2938174
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发表时间：
1991-07
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
A. Atkeson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Atkeson
作者研究了在有两个障碍的环境中，贷款的最佳模式。第一个障碍是，贷款人无法观察借款人是否投资或消费借款。这一障碍导致了投资中的道德风险问题。第二个障碍是借款人可以选择拒绝偿还债务。最优契约表明，借款国经历资本外流时，最坏的实现产出发生。这种看似反常的资本外流模式是解决投资道德风险问题的最佳方案的必要组成部分。版权所有1991年由计量经济学会。
The author examines the optimal pattern of lending in an environment in which there are two impediments to contracting. The first impediment is that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds. This impediment leads to a moral hazard problem in investment. The second impediment is that the borrower may choose to repudiate his debts. The optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of output occur. This seemingly perverse pattern of capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.