Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Forbearance: Are Caps on Insured Deposits Optimal?

Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Forbearance: Are Caps on Insured Deposits Optimal?
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存款保险和监管宽容:受保存款上限是否最优?

DOI:
10.2307/2078010
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发表时间:
1994
期刊:
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Linda Allen
Linda Allen
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
J. Dreyfus;A. Saunders;Linda Allen

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

相当多的学术和公共政策关注一直集中在存款保险合同上,特别是其定价错误的存款保险费。这导致了关于存款保险担保最优定价的大量文献[参见默顿(1977,1978)、派尔(1983)、罗恩和维尔马(1986)、阿查里亚和德雷福斯(1989)以及艾伦和Saunders(1993)等例子]。此外,其他作者还研究了在没有明确的基于风险的保险费的情况下,没有保险的存款人或债务持有人以基于市场的风险溢价的形式提供市场纪律的能力[例如,参见Ellis和Flannery(1989)以及Avery、Belton和Goldberg(1988)]。然而,第三种管制手段,即对存款保险承保的数额设定上限,却没有受到严格的调查。特别是,虽然联邦存款保险公司(1989)和其他人已经考虑了限制存款保险范围的一般利弊,例如,通过降低每个账户保险金额的10万美元上限或通过限制存款经纪,但无法对覆盖上限的作用进行正式分析
CONSIDERABLE ACADEMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY attention has been focused on the deposit insurance contract and, in particular, its mispriced deposit insurance premium. This has resulted in a burgeoning literature on the optimal pricing of deposit insurance guarantees [see Merton (1977, 1978), Pyle (1983), Ronn and Verma (1986), Acharya and Dreyfus (1989), and Allen and Saunders (1993) for examples]. In addition, other authors have studied the ability of uninsured depositors, or debtholders, to provide market discipline in the form of marketbased risk premia in the absence of explicit risk-based insurance premia [see, for example, Ellis and Flannery (1989) and Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988)]. However, a third control instrument, namely the setting of ceilings or caps on the amount of deposit insurance coverage, has not been subject to rigorous investigation. In particular, while the FDIC (1989) and others have considered the general pros and cons of limiting the scope of deposit insurance, for instance, by lowering the $100,000 ceiling on the amount of insurance per account or by restricting the brokering in of deposits,l no formal analysis of the role of coverage caps can be