Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Forbearance: Are Caps on Insured Deposits Optimal?
Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Forbearance: Are Caps on Insured Deposits Optimal?
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存款保险和监管宽容:受保存款上限是否最优?
DOI:
10.2307/2078010
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发表时间:
1994
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Linda Allen
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Dreyfus;A. Saunders;Linda Allen
CONSIDERABLE ACADEMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY attention has been focused on the deposit insurance contract and, in particular, its mispriced deposit insurance premium. This has resulted in a burgeoning literature on the optimal pricing of deposit insurance guarantees [see Merton (1977, 1978), Pyle (1983), Ronn and Verma (1986), Acharya and Dreyfus (1989), and Allen and Saunders (1993) for examples]. In addition, other authors have studied the ability of uninsured depositors, or debtholders, to provide market discipline in the form of marketbased risk premia in the absence of explicit risk-based insurance premia [see, for example, Ellis and Flannery (1989) and Avery, Belton and Goldberg (1988)]. However, a third control instrument, namely the setting of ceilings or caps on the amount of deposit insurance coverage, has not been subject to rigorous investigation. In particular, while the FDIC (1989) and others have considered the general pros and cons of limiting the scope of deposit insurance, for instance, by lowering the $100,000 ceiling on the amount of insurance per account or by restricting the brokering in of deposits,l no formal analysis of the role of coverage caps can be