Certificateless and Lightweight Authentication Scheme for Vehicular Communication Networks

Certificateless and Lightweight Authentication Scheme for Vehicular Communication Networks
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DOI:
10.1109/tvt.2020.3042431
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发表时间:
2020-12-01
影响因子:
6.8
通讯作者:
Maple, Carsten
Maple, Carsten
中科院分区:
计算机科学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hathal, Waleed;Cruickshank, Haitham;Maple, Carsten

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减少道路交通事故的数量是世界各国政府的一个关键议程项目。这导致了对车辆通信系统(VCS)的关注增加,这被视为一项重要的技术,可以显著改善道路安全。使用VCS,车辆可以形成一个动态的自配置网络,使车辆能够与其他车辆(V2V)和路边基础设施(V2I)通信。然而,这种无线通信通道容易受到攻击,因此在部署之前需要设计通信认证方案。先前的工作主要集中在利用数字签名方法来实现安全要求,但由于VCS的特殊特性,这种方法不太适合VCS的安全相关应用,因为它们会产生很高的通信和计算开销。为了解决这个问题,我们提出了一个无证书的轻量级身份验证方案,为VCS提供安全通信的手段。在这项工作中,我们引入了身份验证令牌,它取代了数字证书,以减轻受信任机构(TA)的证书管理负担。此外,令牌的使用确保了V2I通信的相互身份验证。此外,我们采用TESLA作为底层广播认证协议,以实现安全消息广播所需的安全目标。通过对该方案的安全性分析和广泛的仿真,结果表明该方案能够抵御各种类型的攻击。此外,与基于类似技术的轻量级身份验证方案相比,它在验证延迟、可伸缩性和通信开销方面具有更好的性能。因此,该方案非常适合于VCS
Reducing the number of road accidents is a key agenda item for governments across the world. This has led to an increase in the amount of attention given to Vehicular Communication Systems (VCS), which are seen as an important technology that can offer significant improvements in road safety. Using VCS, vehicles can form a dynamic self-configuring network that enables a vehicle to communicate with other vehicles (V2V) and roadside infrastructure (V2I). However, such wireless communication channels are vulnerable to attacks, and therefore an authentication scheme for communications should be designed before the deployment. Prior work has focused on utilising digital signature approaches to achieve the security requirements, but due to the special characteristics of VCS, such approaches are not well suited for safety related applications of VCS, since they incur high communication and computation overheads. To combat this issue, we propose a certificateless and lightweight authentication scheme to provide means of secure communications for VCS. In this work we introduce authentication tokens, which replace digital certificates to reduce the burden of certificate management on a Trusted Authority (TA). In addition, the utilisation of tokens ensures that mutual authentication is achieved for V2I communication. Moreover, we employ TESLA as the underlying broadcast authentication protocol to achieve the required security goals for safety message broadcasting. According to the security analysis and extensive simulation of our scheme, the results show that it can withstands various types of attacks. Also it has better performance in term of verification delay, scalability and communication overhead compared to lightweight authentication schemes that are based on similar techniques. Therefore, the scheme is well suited for VCS