Supplier Development and Integration in Competitive Supply Chains
Supplier Development and Integration in Competitive Supply Chains
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竞争性供应链中的供应商开发和整合
DOI：
10.1111/poms.12984
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发表时间：
2019-05-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Zhou, Sean X.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jin, Yannan;Hu, Qiying;Zhou, Sean X.
供应商开发和供应商整合是制造商经常用来提高其供应链效率和竞争力的两个相互关联的战略工具。本文研究了在竞争环境中这两种战略决策的相互作用。具体来说，我们考虑了一个双寡头模型，其中两个供应链，每个由一个制造商和一个供应商组成，在市场上销售可替代的产品。每个制造商从其供应商那里订购组件，并决定是否与供应商整合以及投资多少以帮助降低成本。我们发现，在大多数情况下，制造商与供应商整合后，在供应商开发上的投资更多，并且两个制造商与供应商的整合处于均衡状态。然而，当制造商的供应商开发能力的异质性足够高，更有能力的制造商整合，能力较低的制造商将减少投资后，整合其供应商的供应商开发;在均衡，能力较低的制造商宁愿不整合。此外，当考虑供应商的整合动机时，我们发现能力较低的制造商更有可能不与其供应商整合。我们还将我们的模型扩展到另一种常见的采购结构，即多元化采购，即每个制造商从两个共同的供应商采购（但每个制造商只考虑一个不同供应商的供应商整合和发展）。与前一种情况（我们称之为专门采购）不同，在多元化采购下，一个制造商的供应商整合总是会导致其更多的供应商开发投资，并且两个制造商会在均衡时进行整合。最后，当每个制造商可以选择是否从一个或两个供应商的来源，我们表明，专门的采购是均衡结构。
Supplier development and supplier integration are two deeply interconnected strategic tools that manufacturers often employ to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of their supply chains. This paper studies the interaction of these two strategic decisions in a competitive environment. Specifically, we consider a duopoly model where two supply chains, each consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier, sell substitutable products in the market. Each manufacturer orders components from its supplier and decides whether to integrate with the supplier and how much to invest to help reduce its cost. We find that, in most cases, a manufacturer invests more on supplier development after it integrates with its supplier; and both manufacturers integrate with their suppliers at equilibrium. However, when the heterogeneity of the manufacturers' supplier development capabilities is sufficiently high and the more capable manufacturer integrates, the less capable manufacturer would invest less on supplier development after integrating its supplier; and at equilibrium, the less capable manufacturer prefers not to integrate. Furthermore, when considering the suppliers' incentives to be integrated, we find that the less capable manufacturer is more likely not to integrate with its supplier. We also extend our model to another commonly seen sourcing structure, that is, diversified sourcing, where each manufacturer sources from two common suppliers (but each only considers supplier integration and development for one distinct supplier). In contrast to the previous case (which we call dedicated sourcing), under diversified sourcing, supplier integration of a manufacturer always leads to its more supplier development investment and both manufacturers would integrate at equilibrium. Finally, when each manufacturer could choose whether to source from one or two suppliers, we show that dedicated sourcing is the equilibrium structure.