Patents, innovation, and the welfare effects of Medicare Part D.
Patents, innovation, and the welfare effects of Medicare Part D.
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专利、创新和 Medicare D 部分的福利影响。
DOI：
10.1108/s0731-2199(2010)0000022017
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sood,Neeraj
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gailey,Adam;Lakdawalla,Darius;Sood,Neeraj
目的-评估医疗保险D部分计划的效率后果。方法-我们开发并实证校准了一个简单的理论模型，以检验医疗保险D部分的静态和动态福利效应。研究结果-我们表明，医疗保险D部分可以同时减少药品垄断定价带来的静态无谓损失，并改善创新激励。我们估计，即使排除该计划的保险价值，医疗保险D部分的福利收益也大致等于它的社会成本。该计划每年可减少51.1亿美元的静态载重损失，并从额外的创新中获得至少30亿美元的年度价值。启示——医疗保险D部分和其他公共处方药计划可以改善福利，即使对风险中性和纯粹自利的消费者也是如此。此外，谈判降低品牌药的价格可能会进一步增加项目的社会回报。独创性-这项研究表明，纯粹的效率动机，甚至没有出现在医疗保险D部分的政策辩论中，几乎可以证明该计划本身的优点。
Purpose – To evaluate the efficiency consequences of the Medicare Part D program.Methods – We develop and empirically calibrate a simple theoretical model to examine the static and the dynamic welfare effects of Medicare Part D.Findings – We show that Medicare Part D can simultaneously reduce static deadweight loss from monopoly pricing of drugs and improve incentives for innovation. We estimate that even after excluding the insurance value of the program, the welfare gain of Medicare Part D roughly equals its social costs. The program generates $5.11 billion of annual static deadweight loss reduction and at least $3.0 billion of annual value from extra innovation.Implications – Medicare Part D and other public prescription drug programs can be welfare-improving, even for risk-neutral and purely self-interested consumers. Furthermore, negotiation for lower branded drug prices may further increase the social return to the program.Originality – This study demonstrates that pure efficiency motives, which do not even surface in the policy debate over Medicare Part D, can nearly justify the program on their own merits.