TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS - GOVERNANCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
TRANSACTION-COST ECONOMICS - GOVERNANCE OF CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
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DOI：
10.1086/466942
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发表时间：
1979-01-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
WILLIAMSON, OE
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
WILLIAMSON, OE
新制度经济学关注的是交易成本的起源、发生和后果。事实上，如果交易成本可以忽略不计，那么经济活动的组织就无关紧要了，因为一种组织模式相对于另一种组织模式的任何优势都会被无成本的合同所消除。但是，尽管人们越来越认识到交易成本是经济学研究的核心，怀疑论者仍然存在.斯坦利·费希尔的抱怨是典型的：“交易成本作为一种理论工具，有着当之无愧的恶名...... [部分]是因为人们怀疑，几乎任何事情都可以通过援引适当指定的交易成本来合理化。“2换句话说，自由度太多;概念需要定义。
THE new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs. Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activity is irrelevant, since any advantages one mode of organization appears to hold over another will simply be eliminated by costless contracting. But despite the growing realization that transaction costs are central to the study of economics,'skeptics remain. Stanley Fischer's complaint is typical:" Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical device...[partly] because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified transaction costs." 2 Put differently, there are too many degrees of freedom; the concept wants for definition.