EA-Market: Empowering Real-Time Big Data Applications with Short-Term Edge SLA Leases
EA-Market: Empowering Real-Time Big Data Applications with Short-Term Edge SLA Leases
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DOI：
10.1109/icccn58024.2023.10230160
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发表时间：
2023-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ruozhou Yu;Huayue Gu;Xiaojian Wang;Fangtong Zhou;G. Xue;Dejun Yang
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文献类型：
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作者：
Ruozhou Yu;Huayue Gu;Xiaojian Wang;Fangtong Zhou;G. Xue;Dejun Yang
边缘计算有望带来低延迟和高吞吐量的计算，但有限的边缘资源可能会导致频繁的拥塞，导致性能不稳定和不可预测。为确保性能保证，应用程序所有者可以与边缘提供商就资源预留或优先级使用建立服务级别协议(SLA)。但对于应用程序所有者来说，根据高峰需求租用长期SLA的成本效益不高，因为需求可能会波动，而且租用的资源在大多数时间可能处于空闲或未充分利用的状态。本文研究了短期边缘SLA租赁的市场机制设计，重点研究了以吞吐量和延迟为目标的实时大数据应用。应用程序提交短期SLA请求，以在高峰时段为用户提供有保证的性能。随着SLA请求随着时间的推移而到达，边缘提供商动态配置边缘资源以满足请求，同时根据当前需求向应用程序所有者收费。我们设计了EA-Market，这是一种在线组合拍卖机制，在保证真实性、预算平衡、个体理性和计算效率的同时，实现了竞争性社会福利。值得注意的是，我们的机制使每个应用程序所有者能够在不了解边缘基础设施的情况下出价，并使边缘提供商完全控制资源调配以满足请求。我们进行了理论分析和仿真，以评估我们的机制的有效性。
Edge computing promises to bring low-latency and high-throughput computing, but the limited edge resources may cause frequent congestion and lead to unstable and unpredictable performance. To ensure performance guarantee, application owners can establish Service-Level Agreements (SLAs) with the edge provider for resource reservation or priority usage. But it is cost-inefficient for application owners to lease long-term SLAs based on peak demands, as demands can fluctuate, and the leased resources may be idle or underutilized at most times. This paper studies market mechanism design for short-term edge SLA leases, focusing on real-time big data applications with throughput and latency goals. Applications submit short-term SLA requests to serve users with guaranteed performance during peak hours. As SLA requests arrive over time, the edge provider dynamically provisions edge resources to fulfill the requests, while charging application owners based on the current demands. We design EA-Market, an online combinatorial auction mechanism that achieves a competitive social welfare, while guaranteeing truthfulness, budget balance, individual rationality, and computational efficiency. Notably, our mechanism enables each application owner to bid without knowledge of the edge infrastructure, and gives edge provider full control over resource provisioning to fulfill the requests. We perform theoretical analysis and simulations to evaluate the efficacy of our mechanism.