Cooperation in community interaction without information flows
Cooperation in community interaction without information flows
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DOI：
10.2307/2297892
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发表时间：
1996-07-01
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Ray, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ghosh, P;Ray, D
我们研究合作行为的社区中，有关过去的行为的信息流是有限的或失踪。玩家最初是随机匹配的，不知道彼此过去的行为;他们内生地决定是否继续重复的关系。关于玩家类型的信息不完整：一部分人是近视眼，而其余人原则上有允许合作的折扣因素。我们在这样的社区中定义社会均衡。这种平衡的特点是一个初始的测试阶段，然后合作，如果测试成功。正是短视类型的存在，通过增加进入新关系的障碍，允许合作。我们研究了增加耐心的影响，这有两种形式：增加非近视类型的数量，以及增加非近视类型的折扣因子。这两个概念对可持续的合作程度有着截然不同的影响。
We study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing. Players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other's past actions; they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship. There is incomplete information regarding player types: a subset of the population is myopic, while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation, in principle. We define social equilibrium in such communities. Such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase, followed by cooperation if the test is successful. It is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation, by raising barriers to entry into new relationships. We examine the implications of increased patience, which takes two forms: an increase in the number of non-myopic types, and an increase in the discount factor of non-myopic types. These two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained.