Tracing Cross Border Web Tracking
Tracing Cross Border Web Tracking
复制标题
追踪跨境网络追踪
DOI：
10.1145/3278532.3278561
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Nikolaos Laoutaris
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Costas Iordanou;Georgios Smaragdakis;Ingmar Poese;Nikolaos Laoutaris
跟踪流是最终用户和Web跟踪服务之间的流。我们开发了一种广泛的测量方法，用于大规模量化跨越数据保护边界的跟踪流量，无论是国家还是国际，例如适用《通用数据保护条例》（GDPR）的欧盟28国边界。我们的方法使用浏览器扩展来完全呈现广告和跟踪代码，使用各种列表和索引来提取知名的跟踪器，使用被动DNS复制来获取跟踪器的所有IP范围，以及最先进的地理位置。我们采用我们的方法对数据集从350个真实的用户的浏览器扩展在一段时间内超过四个月，然后概括我们的结果，通过分析数十亿的网络跟踪流量超过60万宽带和移动的用户从4个大型欧洲ISP。我们发现，大多数跟踪流跨越欧洲的国界，但与流行的看法不同，它们很好地限制在更大的GDPR管辖范围内。简单的DNS重定向和PoP镜像可以增加国家限制，同时密封欧洲内几乎所有的跟踪流。最后，我们表明，即使在敏感的，因此受保护的数据类别和群体，包括健康，性取向，未成年人等，跨境跟踪也很普遍。
A tracking flow is a flow between an end user and a Web tracking service. We develop an extensive measurement methodology for quantifying at scale the amount of tracking flows that cross data protection borders, be it national or international, such as the EU28 border within which the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies. Our methodology uses a browser extension to fully render advertising and tracking code, various lists and heuristics to extract well known trackers, passive DNS replication to get all the IP ranges of trackers, and state-of-the art geolocation. We employ our methodology on a dataset from 350 real users of the browser extension over a period of more than four months, and then generalize our results by analyzing billions of web tracking flows from more than 60 million broadband and mobile users from 4 large European ISPs. We show that the majority of tracking flows cross national borders in Europe but, unlike popular belief, are pretty well confined within the larger GDPR jurisdiction. Simple DNS redirection and PoP mirroring can increase national confinement while sealing almost all tracking flows within Europe. Last, we show that cross boarder tracking is prevalent even in sensitive and hence protected data categories and groups including health, sexual orientation, minors, and others.