Investment-based financing constraints and debt renegotiation
Investment-based financing constraints and debt renegotiation
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.11.005
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发表时间：
2015-02
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
T. Shibata;M. Nishihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Shibata;M. Nishihara
我们考虑了当公司面临债务发行上限时，股东在财务困境中的议价能力如何影响融资和投资决策之间的相互作用。我们得到了四个结果。首先，较弱的股东的议价能力更有可能是该公司的财务约束。第二，投资数量与股东的议价能力无关。第三，与无约束的情况相反，受约束的信用利差随着股东讨价还价能力的增加而增加。第四，较高的波动性和较弱的股东的议价能力可能是公司更喜欢发行债务的重新谈判，而不是债务没有重新谈判。
We consider how equity holders’ bargaining power during financial distress influences the interactions between financing and investment decisions when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We obtain four results. First, weaker equity holders’ bargaining power is more likely that the firm is financially constrained. Second, the investment quantity is independent of equity holders’ bargaining power. Third, the constrained credit spreads are increasing with equity holders’ bargaining power, contrary to the unconstrained ones. Fourth, higher volatility and weaker equity holders’ bargaining power are likely that the firm prefers to issue debt with renegotiation, compared with debt without renegotiation.