Secure Application Continuity in Intermittent Systems
Secure Application Continuity in Intermittent Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/igcc.2018.8752145
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发表时间：
2018-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Charles Suslowicz;Archanaa S. Krishnan;Daniel Dinu;P. Schaumont
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文献类型：
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作者：
Charles Suslowicz;Archanaa S. Krishnan;Daniel Dinu;P. Schaumont
间歇性系统在没有恒定可靠电源的情况下操作嵌入式设备，而是依赖于不可靠的电源，例如能量采集器。它们通过在断电期间保留和恢复系统状态作为检查点来克服间歇性断电的限制。以前的工作已经解决了大量的问题所造成的间歇性的范例，但不考虑保护间歇性系统。在本文中，我们解决的安全问题，通过引入检查点的嵌入式设备。当保存检查点的非易失性存储器可能被篡改时，检查点可以被重放或复制。我们建议安全的应用程序连续性作为对这些攻击的防御。安全的应用程序连续性可确保应用程序在断电时继续运行。在我们的安全连续性解决方案中，我们定义了一个协议，为检查点添加完整性，真实性和新鲜度。我们为我们的安全检查点设计开发了两种解决方案。第一种解决方案使用AES的硬件加速实现，而第二种解决方案基于轻量级加密算法Chaskey的软件实现。我们分析了这些设计的可行性和开销方面的能源消耗，执行时间和代码大小在几个应用程序配置。然后，我们将此开销与非安全检查点系统进行比较。我们的结论是，保护应用程序的连续性并不便宜，它增加了检查点恢复的开销从3.79 μ J的硬件加速的解决方案和57.02 μJ的基于软件的解决方案的42.96 μ J。据我们所知，还没有人考虑过为间歇性作业提供安全保障的费用。我们的工作为未来的开发人员提供了这种成本的实证评估，并为未来在这一领域的研究提出了问题。
Intermittent systems operate embedded devices without a source of constant reliable power, relying instead on an unreliable source such as an energy harvester. They overcome the limitation of intermittent power by retaining and restoring system state as checkpoints across periods of power loss. Previous works have addressed a multitude of problems created by the intermittent paradigm, but do not consider securing intermittent systems. In this paper, we address the security concerns created through the introduction of checkpoints to an embedded device. When the non-volatile memory that holds checkpoints can be tampered, the checkpoints can be replayed or duplicated. We propose secure application continuity as a defense against these attacks. Secure application continuity provides assurance that an application continues where it left off upon power loss. In our secure continuity solution, we define a protocol that adds integrity, authenticity, and freshness to checkpoints. We develop two solutions for our secure checkpointing design. The first solution uses a hardware accelerated implementation of AES, while the second one is based on a software implementation of a lightweight cryptographic algorithm, Chaskey. We analyze the feasibility and overhead of these designs in terms of energy consumption, execution time, and code size across several application configurations. Then, we compare this overhead to a non-secure checkpointing system. We conclude that securing application continuity does not come cheap and that it increases the overhead of checkpoint restoration from 3.79 μJ to 42.96 μJ with the hardware accelerated solution and 57.02 μJ with the software based solution. To our knowledge, no one has yet considered the cost to provide security guarantees for intermittent operations. Our work provides future developers with an empirical evaluation of this cost, and with a problem statement for future research in this area.