A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders
复制标题
针对多个附加投标人的事先独立的收入最大化拍卖
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anna R. Karlin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kira Goldner;Anna R. Karlin
Babaioff等人的最新工作？[1]，Yaoi¾？[30]和Cai等人？[7]显示了如何构建额外的竞标者的近似最佳拍卖，鉴于可以访问竞标者的先生在本文中绘制了“值”，以Dhangwatnotai等人的单个样本方法为基础先生，只要项目分布是常规的。
Recent work by Babaioff et al.i¾?[1], Yaoi¾?[30], and Cai et al.i¾?[7] shows how to construct an approximately optimal auction for additive bidders, given access to the priors from which the bidders' values are drawn. In this paper, building on the single sample approach of Dhangwatnotai et al.i¾?[15], we show how the auctioneer can obtain approximately optimal expected revenue in this setting without knowing the priors, as long as the item distributions are regular.
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764539
发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
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作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos