An evolutionary mechanism for diversity in siderophore-producing bacteria
An evolutionary mechanism for diversity in siderophore-producing bacteria
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01717.x
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发表时间：
2012-02-01
期刊：
影响因子：
8.8
通讯作者：
Jansen, Vincent A. A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lee, William;van Baalen, Minus;Jansen, Vincent A. A.
细菌产生各种各样的铁载体，以在其环境中寻找铁。我们认为，这种多样性是铁载体生产者(合作者)和非生产者(骗子)之间相互作用的结果：当有许多骗子利用铁载体类型时，突变株产生优势种群无法使用的铁载体是有益的。我们制定并分析了一个带有标签的公共产品的数学模型，以调查出现多样性的可能性。我们发现，尽管作弊者在大多数情况下很少见，但作弊者通过调节不同的合作者群体，在维持多样性方面发挥了关键作用。这种阈值触发的反馈可以防止任何合作者的污点支配其他合作者。我们的研究为多样性的进化提供了一种新的一般机制，这种机制可能适用于许多形式的社会行为。
Bacteria produce a great diversity of siderophores to scavenge for iron in their environment. We suggest that this diversity results from the interplay between siderophore producers (cooperators) and non-producers (cheaters): when there are many cheaters exploiting a siderophore type it is beneficial for a mutant to produce a siderophore unusable by the dominant population. We formulated and analysed a mathematical model for tagged public goods to investigate the potential for the emergence of diversity. We found that, although they are rare most of the time, cheaters play a key role in maintaining diversity by regulating the different populations of cooperators. This threshold-triggered feedback prevents any stain of cooperators from dominating the others. Our study provides a novel general mechanism for the evolution of diversity that may apply to many forms of social behaviour.