N-PERSON GAMES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CO-OPERATION - A MODEL BASED ON PREDATOR INSPECTION IN FISH
N-PERSON GAMES AND THE EVOLUTION OF CO-OPERATION - A MODEL BASED ON PREDATOR INSPECTION IN FISH
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DOI：
10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80017-7
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发表时间：
1990-01-09
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
DUGATKIN, LA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DUGATKIN, LA
提出了两个N人对策理论模型，研究了捕食者侦察过程中鱼类合作的演化。捕食者检查发生在小鱼群中，其中一到几个个体，“检查员”（合作者）脱离鱼群，谨慎地接近捕食者，以获得有关这种潜在危险的信息。在这里提出的模型中，留在浅滩而不检查被认为是一种背叛行为。模型I和II都产生了一个稳定的内部多态性的inspectors和noninspectors。虽然检查员的均衡频率可能很低（即，
Two N-person game theorectical models examining the evolution of co-operation during predator inspection in fish are presented. Predator inspection occurs in small shoals of fish, in which one to a few individuals, the "inspectors" (co-operators) break away from the shoal and cautiously approach a predator to obtain information on this potential danger. In the models presented here, remaining with the shoal and not inspecting is considered an act of defection. Both model I and II produce a stable internal polymorphism of insepctors and noninspectors. While the equilibrial frequency of inspectors can be low (i.e.