Certificateless threshold cryptosystem secure against chosen-ciphertext attack
Certificateless threshold cryptosystem secure against chosen-ciphertext attack
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ins.2007.06.014
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发表时间：
2007-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yu Long;Kefei Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yu Long;Kefei Chen
本文提出了第一个无证书门限解密方案，该方案既避免了分布式网络中的单点失效问题，又避免了基于身份密码系统中固有的密钥托管问题。该方案具有抗门限选择密文攻击的安全性。它容忍可以替换公钥的I型攻击者和可以访问系统主密钥的II型攻击者。在随机预言机模型下给出了安全性的形式化证明，并假设一些与双线性Diffie-Hellman问题密切相关的问题是计算困难的。
This paper proposes the first certificateless threshold decryption scheme which avoids both the single point of failure in the distributed networks and the inherent key escrow problem in identity-based cryptosystem. The scheme is secure against threshold chosen-ciphertext attack. It tolerates the Type I adversary that can replace public key and the Type II adversary that has access to the system’s master key. The formal proof of security is presented in the random oracle model, assuming some underlying problems closely related to the Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Problem are computationally hard.