Replication data for: Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA's Clean Power Plan
Replication data for: Strategic Policy Choice in State-Level Regulation: The EPA's Clean Power Plan
复制标题
复制数据：州级监管中的战略政策选择：美国环保局的清洁能源计划
DOI：
10.3886/e114648v1
复制
发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christopher R. Knittel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Bushnell;S. Holland;Jonathan E. Hughes;Christopher R. Knittel
美国环保署的清洁能源计划设定了到2030年减少二氧化碳排放率的目标，各州之间差异很大。各国可以选择其使用的监管机制，以及是否与其他国家一起实现其目标。我们用理论和模拟分析了采用费率标准与限额交易的动机。我们表明，从消费者和发电商的角度来看，采用低效率的费率标准是一个占主导地位的战略。西方电力系统的数值模拟突出了不协调政策的激励，这些政策降低了福利，增加了相对于协调的排放。(JEL H76、Q53、Q54、Q58）
The EPA’s Clean Power Plan sets goals for CO2 emissions rate reductions by 2030 that vary substantially across states. States can choose the regulatory mechanism they use and whether or not to join with other states in implementing their goals. We analyze incentives to adopt rate standards versus cap-and-trade with theory and simulation. We show conditions where adoption of inefficient rate standards is a dominant strategy from both consumers’ and generators’ perspectives. Numerical simulations of the western electricity system highlight incentives for uncoordinated policies that lower welfare and increase emissions relative to coordination. (JEL H76, Q53, Q54, Q58)